

Stacks WSTS

Security Assessment

February 4th, 2025 — Prepared by OtterSec

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01 — Executive Summary

Overview

Trust Machines engaged OtterSec to assess the wsts program. This assessment was conducted between January 21st and January 31st, 2025. For more information on our auditing methodology, refer to Appendix B.

Key Findings

We produced 12 findings throughout this audit engagement.

In particular, we identified several high vulnerabilities, including an absence of verification to ensure that the key IDs provided in the nonce gathering round and the signature share verification phase are consistent, allowing malicious parties to provide fewer key IDs in their signature shares, resulting in invalid signatures (OS-STS-ADV-00).

Furthermore, malicious parties may send fewer private shares than expected, resulting in timeouts and incorrect threshold evaluations, which may allow the protocol to proceed despite missing the required share count (OS-STS-ADV-07), and there is a lack of validation to ensure that the number of keys per participant is greater than or equal to the number of participating parties, enabling parties without associated keys to participate in the protocol, performing actions such as sending nonces (OS-STS-ADV-06).

Additionally, The FIRE algorithm's utilization of signer key IDs may allow zero key ID values during signer initialization and private share distribution, risking exposure of private signing keys associated with such IDs (OS-STS-ADV-08).

We also advised to ensure adherence to the FROST standard, as in the current implementation, the omission of hashing the group public key when computing the binding factor deviates from the FROST standard (OS-STS-SUG-02). Lastly, we provided suggestions to address the possibility of batching private share verifications, allowing an adversary to manipulate the shares such that their sum appears valid, even if the individual shares themselves are invalid (??.

02 — Scope

The source code was delivered to us in a Git repository at https://github.com/Trust-Machines/wsts. This audit was performed against 612c023.


A brief description of the program is as follows:

Name	Description
wsts	A system for creating Weighted Schnorr Threshold Signatures (WileyProofs). It enables a group of signers, each controlling a set of keys, to produce a valid Schnorr signature, provided that at least T (the threshold) signers act honestly.

03 — Findings

Overall, we reported 12 findings.

We split the findings into **vulnerabilities** and **general findings**. Vulnerabilities have an immediate impact and should be remediated as soon as possible. General findings do not have an immediate impact but will aid in mitigating future vulnerabilities.



04 — Vulnerabilities

Here, we present a technical analysis of the vulnerabilities we identified during our audit. These vulnerabilities have *immediate* security implications, and we recommend remediation as soon as possible.

Rating criteria can be found in Appendix A.

ID	Severity	Status	Description
OS-STS-ADV-00	HIGH	RESOLVED ⊗	There is no verification to ensure that the key_ids provided in the nonce gathering round and in the signature share verification are consistent, allowing malicious parties to provide fewer key_ids in their signature shares, resulting in invalid signatures.
OS-STS-ADV-01	HIGH	RESOLVED ⊗	The absence of key ID hashing in the SignatureShareResponse message allows for potential manipulation of key IDs without detection, compromising the integrity of the signature sharing process.
OS-STS-ADV-02	HIGH	RESOLVED 🕢	gather_nonces in the FROST implementation lacks validation for the key_ids field, allowing malicious parties to provide out-of-range values, resulting in the failure of signature share verification.
OS-STS-ADV-03	HIGH	RESOLVED 🕢	A malicious party may submit a public share utilizing another signer's party ID, overwriting the original commitment. This results in a failure of verification in compute_secret , falsely marking the legitimate signer as malicious.
OS-STS-ADV-04	HIGH	RESOLVED ⊘	A malicious party may manipulate src_id to overwrite legitimate private shares and select public and private shares that pass verification in compute_secret to replace the actual secret shares with their chosen values, thereby compromising the DKG process.

OS-STS-ADV-05	LOW	RESOLVED ⊗	dkg_endedfails to properly handle emptycommsindkg_public_sharesand emptyshares indkg_private_shares, allowingmissing shares to go undetected.
OS-STS-ADV-06	LOW	RESOLVED ⊗	There is no check to ensure that $n_k \geq n_p$, allowing parties without associated keys to participate in the protocol and perform actions such as sending nonces.
OS-STS-ADV-07	LOW	RESOLVED ⊗	Malicious parties may send fewer private shares than expected, resulting in timeouts and incorrect threshold evaluations that may allow the protocol to proceed despite missing the required share count.
OS-STS-ADV-08	LOW	RESOLVED ⊗	The FIRE algorithm's utilization of signer_key_ids may allow zero key_id values during signer initialization and private share distribution, risking exposure of private signing keys associated with those IDs.

Invalid Signatures Due to Mismatch in Key IDs HIGH

OS-STS-ADV-00

Description

FIRE::gather_sig_shares does not enforce a strict check to ensure that the key IDs included in the signature share (|sig_shares[i].key_ids) match those collected during the nonce gathering round. In the nonce gathering round, the coordinator collects key_ids from each participant as part of the nonce gathering response. When the coordinator then proceeds to gather the signature shares from parties, it assumes that the structure of the share (sig_share.key_ids) matches what was initially sent during the nonce gathering.

```
>_ wsts/src/state_machine/coordinator/fire.rs
                                                                                                 RUST
fn gather_sig_shares(
   &mut self,
    packet: &Packet,
   signature_type: SignatureType,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
    if let Message::SignatureShareResponse(sig_share_response) = &packet.msg {
        if response_info.sign_wait_signer_ids.contains(&sig_share_response.signer_id)
            response_info.sign_wait_signer_ids.remove(&sig_share_response.signer_id);
            for sig_share in &sig_share_response.signature_shares {
                for key_id in &sig_share.key_ids {
                    response_info.sign_recv_key_ids.insert(*key_id);
    [\ldots]
```

The issue arises because the coordinator does not verify if the key_ids in the sig_shares (signature shares) match those collected during the nonce-gathering phase. In check_signature_shares, it utilizes sig_shares[i].key_ids from the signature shares, allowing the check to incorrectly pass. Consequently, an invalid signature may be generated without detecting malicious participants, even if the total number of gathered signature shares is below the required threshold.

Remediation

Ensure that the sig_shares[i].key_ids correspond directly to the key_ids collected during the nonce gathering phase. This explicit comparison ensures that both rounds maintain consistent key sets.

Patch

04 — Vulnerabilities Stacks WSTS Audit

Lack of Inclusion of Key ID in Signature Hash HIGH

OS-STS-ADV-01

Description

In the current implementation of net, the key_ids from the signature_share mapping are not included in the hash calculation in the **SignatureShareResponse** message. This opens the door for the key_ids to be tampered with without detection by the coordinator, which undermines the integrity of the signing process. If a malicious participant changes the key_id, it may result in the coordinator associating a signature share with the wrong key.

```
>_ src/net.rs
                                                                                                RUST
impl Signable for SignatureShareResponse {
    fn hash(&self, hasher: &mut Sha256) {
        hasher.update("SIGNATURE_SHARE_RESPONSE".as_bytes());
        hasher.update(self.dkg_id.to_be_bytes());
        hasher.update(self.sign_id.to_be_bytes());
        hasher.update(self.signer_id.to_be_bytes());
        for signature_share in &self.signature_shares {
            hasher.update(signature_share.id.to_be_bytes());
            hasher.update(signature_share.z_i.to_bytes());
```

The integrity of the cryptographic signing process relies on the assumption that each participant is contributing shares corresponding to their own key. Without including key_id in the hash, it will not be possible to ensure that signature share messages are authenticated.

Remediation

Ensure that the key_id is included in the hash calculation of the SignatureShareResponse message.

Patch

Out of Range Key IDS in FROST HIGH

OS-STS-ADV-02

Description

The FROST implementation lacks validation for the key_ids field in the nonce_response during the gather_nonces phase. The valid range for key_ids should be [1"], num_keys + 1], where num_keys is the total number of participant keys. Without this validation, a malicious party could submit key_ids outside this expected range.

```
>_ wsts/src/state_machine/coordinator/fire.rs
                                                                                                RUST
fn gather_nonces([...]) -> Result<(), Error> {
   if let Message::NonceResponse(nonce_response) = &packet.msg {
        if nonce_response.dkg_id != self.current_dkg_id {
            return Err(Error::BadDkgId(nonce_response.dkg_id, self.current_dkg_id));
        if nonce_response.sign_id != self.current_sign_id {
            return Err(Error::BadSignId(
                nonce_response.sign_id,
                self.current_sign_id,
            ));
        if nonce_response.sign_iter_id != self.current_sign_iter_id {
            return Err(Error::BadSignIterId(
                nonce_response.sign_iter_id,
                self.current_sign_iter_id,
            ));
```

Consequently, when the **key_ids** are utilized in **gather_sig_shares** to identify the keys associated with each received signature share and perform verification against the aggregate signature, the verification process will fail.

Remediation

Ensure that all **key_ids** in the received **nonce_response** are within the expected range ([1, num_keys + 1]).

Patch

Possibility of Overwriting Public Share HIGH

OS-STS-ADV-03

Description

dkg_ended in the signer module is responsible for handling the finalization of the distributed key generation phase and storing the received public commitments (public_shares). v2::compute_secret later verifies these commitments against the received private shares. dkg_ended checks if comm (the public commitment) is valid via check_public_shares(comm, threshold). If the check fails, the signer (signer_id) is marked as malicious.

If the check passes, the commitment (comm) is stored in self.commitments under the key party_id, not signer_id. A malicious signer (malicious_id) may submit a valid public commitment but associate it with the party_id of an honest participant (honest_id). This overwrites the actual public commitment of honest_id in self.commitments, replacing it with the maliciously injected one.

Thus when honest_id utilizes its correct private share s for verification in compute::poly(&compute::id(*key_id), &comm.poly) will evaluate the wrong commitment, causing the check to fail and flagging the actual share owner as malicious.

Remediation

Enforce that only signer IDs are utilized, instead of utilizing party_id to store commitments.

Patch

04 — Vulnerabilities Stacks WSTS Audit

Malicious Share Overwrite HIGH

OS-STS-ADV-04

Description

This vulnerability arises from the way private shares are stored and verified in the distributed key generation process. A malicious party may craft both public and private shares that pass verification in compute_secret but ultimately replace the actual private shares. In dkg_private_shares in the signer module, malicious parties may obtain the src_id in the private share, and the private shares in decrypted_shares will be overwritten.

```
>_ src/state_machine/signer/mod.rs
                                                                                                   RUST
pub fn dkg_private_shares<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>([...]) -> Result<Vec<Message>, Error> {
    for (src_id, shares) in &dkg_private_shares.shares {
        let mut decrypted_shares = HashMap::new();
        for (dst_key_id, bytes) in shares {
            if key_ids.contains(dst_key_id) {
                match decrypt(&shared_secret, bytes) {
                     Ok(plain) => match Scalar::try_from(&plain[..]) {
                         0k(s) \Rightarrow \{
                             decrypted_shares.insert(*dst_key_id, s);
                     },[...]
        }[...]
```

Thus, if a malicious signer strategically chooses public and private shares that pass the public and private shares verification in **compute_secret**, the actual shares will be replaced by those chosen by the malicious party. Consecutively, if a threshold number of signers are malicious and they all inject manipulated shares, the threshold security is compromised.

Remediation

Ensure that once a valid private share is assigned to dst_key_id, overwriting it is restricted.

Patch

Improper Validation of Empty Shares Vectors Low



OS-STS-ADV-05

Description

In dkg_ended in the signer module, while the dkg_public_shares and dkg_private_shares for a given signer_id contain the required data, if the vectors are empty (the vector of comms in dkg_public_shares or the shares vector in dkg_private_shares), no missing shares are flagged as missing. Thus, these missing private or public shares will not be added to the respective missing_public_shares and missing_private_shares vectors.

```
>_ src/state_machine/signer/mod.rs
                                                                                                RUST
pub fn dkg_ended<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(&mut self, rng: &mut R) -> Result<Message, Error> {
    for signer_id in &signer_ids_set {
        if let Some(shares) = self.dkg_public_shares.get(signer_id) {
            for (party_id, comm) in shares.comms.iter() {
                if !check_public_shares(comm, threshold) {
                    bad_public_shares.insert(*signer_id);
                } else {
                    self.commitments.insert(*party_id, comm.clone());
        } else {
            missing_public_shares.insert(*signer_id);
        if let Some(shares) = self.dkg_private_shares.get(signer_id) {
            for dst_key_id in self.signer.get_key_ids() {
                for (_src_key_id, shares) in &shares.shares {
                    if shares.get(&dst_key_id).is_none() {
                        missing_private_shares.insert(*signer_id);
        } else {
            missing_private_shares.insert(*signer_id);
   [...]
```

If the comms vector (which contains public commitments) is empty, the loop

(for (party_id, comm) in shares.comms.iter()) will not execute. As a result, the code does not check if any public shares are missing. Similarly, if the shares vector is empty, missing private shares are not flagged. Thus, the absence of public or private shares is not flagged as a problem. As a result, the DKG process continues without detecting that a signer has not properly contributed the shares.

Remediation

Explicitly check for empty comms or shares and add the missing private or public shares to missing_public_shares and missing_private_shares respectively.

Patch

04 — Vulnerabilities Stacks WSTS Audit

Protocol Participation Without Associated Keys Low



OS-STS-ADV-06

Description

The vulnerability arises from a missing validation in the protocol, specifically failing to ensure that the number of keys per participant (n_k) is greater than or equal to the number of participating parties (n_v) . If the protocol allows more participants than the available keys $(n_p > n_k)$, it effectively enables parties without valid key associations to join and interact with the protocol, compromising the signature generation process.

Remediation

Validate that $n_k \ge n_p$ to ensure cryptographic integrity of the signing process.

Patch

Threshold Manipulation via Incorrect Submission of Key IDs Low OS-STS-ADV-

Description

The protocol calculates a threshold (dkg_threshold) based on the expected total number of private shares derived from the key_ids in the configuration. The size of gathered shares (dkg_size) is determined via compute_dkg_private_size , which aggregates valid private shares from participants. However, malicious participants may manipulate this process by selectively submitting fewer private shares, limiting their submissions to only a subset of the key_ids they control. Thus, if sufficient private shares are not gathered within the allowed time frame, the protocol may timeout, fail to meet the threshold, and erroneously proceed to the next phase with an invalid signature.

Remediation

During compute_dkg_private_size, verify that all key_ids listed in the previous

DkgPublicDistribute phase have corresponding private shares in the current DkgPrivateGather phase.

Patch

04 — Vulnerabilities Stacks WSTS Audit

Failure to Filter Invalid Key ID Low



OS-STS-ADV-08

Description

The FIRE algorithm retrieves active_key_ids from the config.signer_key_ids mapping. The **config.signer_key_ids** is expected to provide a mapping from **signer_id** (a unique signer identifier) to the list of key IDs (u32) associated with that participant. If the config.signer_key_ids for any signer_id contains a zero key ID, it will be included in the active_key_ids list because the function does not filter these keys. Additionally, the signer also doesn't check if key_id is in the range when it is initialized.

```
>_ wsts/src/state_machine/signer/mod.rs
                                                                                                    RUST
        if threshold == 0 || threshold > total_keys {
            return Err(Error::InvalidThreshold);
        if dkg_threshold == 0 || dkg_threshold < threshold {</pre>
            return Err(Error::InvalidThreshold);
        let signer = SignerType::new(
            signer_id,
            &key_ids,
            total_signers,
            total_keys,
            threshold,
            rng,
        );
```

Remediation

Ensure that all key IDs are in a specific range.

Patch

05 — General Findings

Here, we present a discussion of general findings during our audit. While these findings do not present an immediate security impact, they represent anti-patterns and may result in security issues in the future.

ID	Description
OS-STS-SUG-00	Batching private share verifications allows an adversary to manipulate the shares such that their sum appears valid, even if the individual shares themselves are invalid.
OS-STS-SUG-01	Suggestions regarding inconsistencies in the codebase and ensuring adherence to coding best practices.
OS-STS-SUG-02	The omission of hashing the group public key when computing the binding factor deviates from the FROST standard.

Batch Verification Bypass

OS-STS-SUG-00

Description

The vulnerability in the batch verification of private shares in v1::compute_secret relates to the possibility of an adversary manipulating the private shares to pass the batch verification process even though the shares are invalid. The issue lies in how batch verification of private shares is performed using multi-scalar multiplication. The code combines the sharers as following: $-f_{j1}(i)G + P_{j1}(i) - f_{j2}(i)G + P_{j2}(i) = 0$. Thus, it batches the sharers into a single multi-scalar multiplication: $\sum_{j}(-f_{j}(i)G + P_{j}(i)) = 0$, assuming the shares are valid if their sum is zero.

This method allows an adversary to craft private shares such that $-f_{j1}(i)G + P_{j1}(i) = x$ and $-f_{j2}(i)G + P_{j2}(i) = -x$. Consequently, when performing batching verification of these private shares via summation, the end result will come out to be zero as the shares cancel each other, thereby passing the validation check. Therefore, the batch verification incorrectly accepts the adversarial shares, even though each individual share is incorrect.

Remediation

We suggest multiplying each term in the batch by a random scalar to prevent this attack.

Stacks WSTS Audit 05 — General Findings

Code Maturity

OS-STS-SUG-01

Description

Mark parties with missing public shares as malicious to strengthen the robustness of the FIRE algorithm. Currently, the function merely returns a failure message (DkgFailure::MissingPublicShares) in dkg_ended, without taking punitive action against the non-compliant participants.

2. To ensure the integrity of the **PublicNonce**, add validation checks to make sure that **D** and **E** are not zero.

```
>_ wsts/src/common.rs

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
/// A commitment to the private nonce
pub struct PublicNonce {
    /// A commitment to the private nonce's first value
    pub D: Point,
    /// A commitment to the private nonce's second value
    pub E: Point,
}
```

Remediation

Implement the above-mentioned suggestions.

Stacks WSTS Audit 05 — General Findings

Deviation from FROST Standards

OS-STS-SUG-02

Description

A potential deviation from the FROST standard (as outlined in this link) exists in the computation of the binding factor (ρ). According to the standard, the group public key should be included in the hash when computing the binding factor. While the security impact of this omission is unclear, aligning with the standard would be advisable.

Remediation

Ensure adherence to the FROST Standard.

A — Vulnerability Rating Scale

We rated our findings according to the following scale. Vulnerabilities have immediate security implications. Informational findings may be found in the General Findings.

CRITICAL

Vulnerabilities that immediately result in a loss of user funds with minimal preconditions.

Examples:

- · Misconfigured authority or access control validation.
- Improperly designed economic incentives leading to loss of funds.

HIGH

Vulnerabilities that may result in a loss of user funds but are potentially difficult to exploit.

Examples:

- · Loss of funds requiring specific victim interactions.
- Exploitation involving high capital requirement with respect to payout.

MEDIUM

Vulnerabilities that may result in denial of service scenarios or degraded usability.

Examples:

- Computational limit exhaustion through malicious input.
- Forced exceptions in the normal user flow.

LOW

Low probability vulnerabilities, which are still exploitable but require extenuating circumstances or undue risk.

Examples:

Oracle manipulation with large capital requirements and multiple transactions.

INFO

Best practices to mitigate future security risks. These are classified as general findings.

Examples:

- Explicit assertion of critical internal invariants.
- · Improved input validation.

B — Procedure

As part of our standard auditing procedure, we split our analysis into two main sections: design and implementation.

When auditing the design of a program, we aim to ensure that the overall economic architecture is sound in the context of an on-chain program. In other words, there is no way to steal funds or deny service, ignoring any chain-specific quirks. This usually requires a deep understanding of the program's internal interactions, potential game theory implications, and general on-chain execution primitives.

One example of a design vulnerability would be an on-chain oracle that could be manipulated by flash loans or large deposits. Such a design would generally be unsound regardless of which chain the oracle is deployed on.

On the other hand, auditing the program's implementation requires a deep understanding of the chain's execution model. While this varies from chain to chain, some common implementation vulnerabilities include reentrancy, account ownership issues, arithmetic overflows, and rounding bugs.

As a general rule of thumb, implementation vulnerabilities tend to be more "checklist" style. In contrast, design vulnerabilities require a strong understanding of the underlying system and the various interactions: both with the user and cross-program.

As we approach any new target, we strive to comprehensively understand the program first. In our audits, we always approach targets with a team of auditors. This allows us to share thoughts and collaborate, picking up on details that others may have missed.

While sometimes the line between design and implementation can be blurry, we hope this gives some insight into our auditing procedure and thought process.